Abstract. Random number generators (RNGs) play a crucial role in many cryptographic schemes and protocols, but their security proof usually assumes that their internal state is initialized with truly random seeds and remains secret at all times. However, in many practical situations these are unrealistic assumptions: The seed is often gathered after a reset/reboot from low entropy external events such as the timing of manual key presses, and the state can be compromised at unknown points in time via side channels or penetration attacks. The usual remedy (used by all the major operating systems, including Windows, Linux, FreeBSD, MacOS, iOS, etc.) is to periodically replenish the internal state through an auxiliary input with additional randomness harvested from the environment. However, recovering from such attacks in a provably correct and computationally optimal way had remained an unsolved challenge so far.
Introduction
Randomness is essential in many facets of cryptography, from the generation of long-term cryptographic keys, to sampling local randomness for encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, and many other randomized cryptographic primitives. As a useful abstraction, designers of such cryptographic schemes assume a source of (nearly) uniform, unbiased, and independent random bits of arbitrary length. In practice, however, this theoretical abstraction is realized by means of a Random Number Generator (RNG), whose goal is to quickly accumulate entropy from various physical sources in the environment (such as keyboard presses or mouse movement) and then convert it into the required source of (pseudo) random bits. We notice that a highly desired (but, alas, rarely achieved) property of such RNGs is their ability to quickly recover from various forms of state compromise, in which the current state S of the RNG becomes known to the attacker, either due to a successful penetration attack, or via side channel leakage, or simply due to insufficient randomness in the initial state. This means that the state S of practical RNGs should be periodically refreshed using the above-mentioned physical sources of randomness I. In contrast, the simpler and much better-understood theoretical model of pseudorandom generators (PRGs) does not allow the state to be refreshed after its initialization. To emphasize this distinction, we will sometimes call our notion an "RNG with input", and notice that virtually all modern operating systems come equipped with such an RNG with input; e.g., /dev/random [Wik04] for Linux, Yarrow [KSF99] for MacOs/iOS/FreeBSD and Fortuna [FS03] for Windows [Fer13] .
Unfortunately, despite the fact that they are widely used and often referred to in various standards [ISO11, Kil11,ESC05,BK12], RNGs with input have received comparatively little attention from theoreticians. The two notable exceptions are the works of Barak ignores the "heart and soul" issue of most real-world RNGs with input, namely, their ability to gradually "accumulate" many low-entropy inputs I into the state S at the same time that they lose entropy due to premature use. In particular, [DPR + 13] showed that the construction of [BH05] (proven secure in their model) may always fail to recover from state compromise when the entropy of each input I 1 , . . . , I q is sufficiently small, even for arbitrarily large q.
Motivated by these considerations, Dodis et al.
[DPR + 13] defined an improved security model for RNGs with input, which explicitly guaranteed eventual recovery from any state compromise, provided that the collective fresh entropy of inputs I 1 , . . . , I q crosses some security threshold γ * , irrespective of the entropies of individual inputs I j . In particular, they demonstrated that Linux's /dev/random does not satisfy their stronger notion of robustness (for similar reasons as the construction of [BH05]), and then constructed a simple scheme which is provably robust in this model. However, as we explain below, their robustness model did not address the issue of efficiency of the recovery mechanism when the RNG is being continuously used after the compromise.
The Premature Next Problem. In this paper, we extend the model of [DPR + 13] to address some additional desirable security properties of RNGs with input not captured by this model. The main such property is resilience to the "premature next attack". This general attack, first explicitly mentioned by Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, and Hall [KSWH98] , is applicable in situations in which the RNG state S has accumulated an insufficient amount of entropy e (which is very common in bootup situations) and then must produce some outputs R via legitimate "next" calls in order to generate various system keys. Not only is this R not fully random (which is expected), but now the attacker can potentially use R to recover the current state S by brute force, effectively "emptying" the e bits of entropy that S accumulated so far. Applied iteratively, this simple attack, when feasible, can prevent the system from ever recovering from compromise, irrespective of the total amount of fresh entropy injected into the system since the last compromise.
At first, it might appear that the only way to prevent this attack is by discovering a sound way to estimate the current entropy in the state and to use this estimate to block the premature next calls. This is essentially the approach taken by Linux's /dev/random and many other RNGs with input. Unfortunately, sound entropy estimation is hard or even infeasible [SV03, FS03] (e.g., [DPR + 13] showed simple ways to completely fool Linux's entropy estimator). This seems to suggest that the modeling of RNGs with input should consider each premature next call as a full state compromise, and this is the highly conservative approach taken by [DPR + 13] (which we will fix in this work).
Fortuna. Fortunately, the conclusion above is overly pessimistic. In fact, the solution idea already comes from two very popular RNGs mentioned above, whose designs were heavily affected by the desire to overcome the premature next problem: Yarrow (designed by Schneier, Kelsey and Ferguson [KSF99] and used by MacOS/iOS/FreeBSD), and its refinement Fortuna (subsequently designed by Ferguson and Schneier [FS03] and used by Windows [Fer13] ). The simple but brilliant idea of these works is to partition the incoming entropy into multiple entropy "pools" and then to cleverly use these pools at vastly different rates when producing outputs, in order to guarantee that at least one pool will eventually accumulate enough entropy to guarantee security before it is "prematurely emptied" by a next call. (See Section 4 for more details. ) Ferguson and Schneier provide good security intuition for their Fortuna "pool scheduler" construction, assuming that all the RNG inputs I 1 , . . . , I q have the same (unknown) entropy and that each of the pools can losslessly accumulate all the entropy that it gets. (They suggest using iterated hashing with a cryptographic hash function as a heuristic way to achieve this.) In particular, if q is the upper bound on the number of inputs, they suggest that one can make the number of pools P = log 2 q, and recover from state compromise (with premature next!) at the loss of a factor O(log q) in the amount of fresh entropy needed.
Our Main Result. Inspired by the idea of Fortuna, we formally extend the prior RNG robustness notion of [DPR + 13] to robustness against premature next. Unlike Ferguson and Schneier, we do so without making any restrictive assumptions such as requiring that the entropy of all the inputs I j be constant. (Indeed, these entropies can be adversarily chosen, as in the model of [DPR + 13], and can be unknown to the RNG.) Also, in our formal and general security model, we do not assume ideal entropy accumulation or inherently rely on cryptographic hash functions. In fact, our model is syntactically very similar to the prior RNG model of [DPR + 13], except: (1) a premature next call is not considered an unrecoverable state corruption, but (2) in addition to the (old) "entropy penalty" parameter γ * , there is a (new) "time penalty" parameter β ≥ 1, measuring how long it will take to recover from state compromise relative to the optimal recovery time needed to receive γ * bits of fresh entropy. (See Figures 2 and 3 .)
To summarize, our model formalizes the problem of designing an efficient recovery mechanism from state compromise as an online optimization problem. If we knew the timing of the last compromise and the amount of entropy gathered since then, we could stop producing any outputs until the state becomes truly random again. However, our challenge is to recover within a time proportional to this optimal solution even in the hardest (and most realistic) case in which (a) we know nothing about the timing of the last state compromise, and the amount of new entropy injected since then into the state, and (b) any premature production of outputs leads to the total loss of all the added entropy used by the RNG, since the attacker can use brute force to enumerate all the possible low-entropy states. In other words, the challenge is to develop recovery mechanisms which are guaranteed to save the day as quickly as possible after a compromise we are not even aware of. The dilemma that we face is that any entropy used prematurely will be lost, and any entropy which is kept unused will delay the recovery.
After extending our model to handle premature next calls, we define the generalized Fortuna construction, which is provably robust against premature next. Although heavily inspired by actual Fortuna, the syntax of our construction is noticeably different (See Figure 5) , since we prove it secure in a stronger model and without any idealized assumptions (like perfect entropy accumulation, which, as demonstrated by the attacks in [DPR + 13], is not a trivial thing to sweep under the rug). In fact, to obtain our construction, we: (a) abstract out a rigorous security notion of a (pool) scheduler; (b) show a formal composition theorem (Theorem 2) stating that a secure scheduler can be composed with any robust RNG in the prior model of [DPR + 13] to achieve security against premature next; (c) obtain our final RNG by using the provably secure RNG of [DPR + 13] and a Fortuna-like scheduler (proven secure in our significantly stronger model). In particular, the resulting RNG is secure in the standard model, and only uses the existence of standard PRGs as its sole computational assumption.
Constant-Rate RNGs. In Section 5.4, we consider the actual constants involved in our construction, and show that under a reasonable setting or parameters, our RNG will recover from compromise in β = 4 times the number of steps it takes to get 20 to 30 kB of fresh entropy. While these numbers are a bit high, they are also obtained in an extremely strong adversarial model. In contrast, remember that Ferguson and Schneier informally analyzed the security of Fortuna in a much simpler case in which entropy drips in at a constant rate. While restrictive, in Section 6 we also look at the security of generalized Fortuna (with a better specialized scheduler) in this model, as it could be useful in some practical scenarios and allow for a more direct comparison with the original Fortuna. In this simpler constant entropy dripping rate, we estimate that our RNG (with standard security parameters) will recover from a complete compromise immediately after it gets about 2 to 3 kB of entropy (see Section 6.2), which is comparable to [FS03] 's (corrected) claim, but without assuming ideal entropy accumulation into the state. In fact, our optimized constant-rate scheduler beats the original Fortuna's scheduler by almost a factor of 2 in terms of entropy efficiency. Rate Lower Bound. We also show that any "Fortuna-like construction" (which tries to collect entropy in multiple pools and cleverly utilize them with an arbitrary scheduler) must lose at least a factor Ω(log q) in its "entropy efficiency", even in the case where all inputs I j have an (unknown) constant-rate entropy. This suggests that the original scheduler of Fortuna (which used log q pools which evenly divide the entropy among them) is asymptotically optimal in the constant-rate case (as is our improved version).
Semi-Adaptive Set-Refresh. As a final result, we make progress in addressing another important limitation of the model of Dodis et al. [DPR + 13] (and our direct extension of the current model that handles premature nexts). Deferring technical details to Section 7, in that model the attacker A had very limited opportunities to adaptively influence the samples produced by another adversarial quantity, called the distribution sampler D. As explained in there and in [DPR + 13], some assumption of this kind is necessary to avoid impossibility results, but it does limit the applicability of the model to some real-world situations. As the initial step to removing this limitation, in Section 7.1 we introduce the "semi-adaptive set-refresh" model and show that both the original RNG of [DPR + 13] and our new RNG are provably secure in this more realistic adversarial model. Other Related Work. As we mentioned, there is very little literature focusing on the design and analysis of RNGs with inputs in the standard model. In addition to [BH05, DPR + 13], some analysis of the Linux RNG was done by Lacharme, Röck, Strubel and Videau [LRSV12] . On the other hand, many works showed devastating attacks on various cryptographic schemes when using weak randomness; some notable examples include [GPR06, KSWH98, NS02, CVE08, DGP07, LHA + 12, HDWH12].
Preliminaries
Entropy. For a discrete distribution X, we denote its min-entropy by H ∞ (X) = min x {− log Pr[X = x]}. We also define worst-case min-entropy of X conditioned on another random variable Z by in the following conservative way:
. We use this definition instead of the usual one so that it satisfies the following relation, which is called the "chain rule":
Pseudorandom Functions and Generators. We say that a function F : {0, 1} × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m is a (deterministic) (t, q F , ε)-pseudorandom function (PRF) if no adversary running in time t and making q F oracle queries to F(key, ·) can distinguish between F(key, ·) and a random function with probability greater than ε when key $ ← {0, 1} . We say that a function G : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n is a (deterministic) (t, ε)-pseudorandom generator (PRG) if no adversary running in time t can distinguish between G(seed) and uniformly random bits with probability greater than ε when seed $ ← {0, 1} m . Game Playing Framework. For our security definitions and proofs we use the code-based game-playing framework of [BR06] . A game GAME has an initialize procedure, procedures to respond to adversary oracle queries, and a finalize procedure. A game GAME is executed with an adversary A as follows: First, initialize executes, and its outputs are the inputs to A. Then A executes, its oracle queries being answered by the corresponding procedures of GAME. When A terminates, its output becomes the input to the finalize procedure. The output of the latter is called the output of the game, and we let GAME A ⇒ y denote the event that this game output takes value y. A GAME denotes the output of the adversary and Adv GAME A = 2 × Pr[GAME A ⇒ 1] − 1. Our convention is that Boolean flags are assumed initialized to false and that the running time of the adversary A is defined as the total running time of the game with the adversary in expectation, including the procedures of the game.
RNG with Input: Modeling and Security
In this section we present formal modeling and security definitions for RNGs with input, largely following [DPR + 13].
Definition 1 (RNG with input). An RNG with input is a triple of algorithms G = (setup, refresh, next) and a triple (n, , p) ∈ N 3 where n is the state length, is the output length and p is the input length of G:
-setup: a probabilistic algorithm that outputs some public parameters seed for the generator.
-refresh: a deterministic algorithm that, given seed, a state S ∈ {0, 1} n and an input I ∈ {0, 1} p , outputs a new state S = refresh(seed, S, I) ∈ {0, 1} n . -next: a deterministic algorithm that, given seed and a state S ∈ {0, 1} n , outputs a pair (S , R) = next(seed, S) where S ∈ {0, 1} n is the new state and R ∈ {0, 1} is the output.
Before moving to defining our security notions, we notice that there are two adversarial entities we need to worry about: the adversary A whose task is (intuitively) to distinguish the outputs of the RNG from random, and the distribution sampler D whose task is to produce inputs I 1 , I 2 , . . . , which have high entropy collectively, but somehow help A in breaking the security of the RNG. In other words, the distribution sampler models potentially adversarial environment (or "nature") where our RNG is forced to operate.
Distribution Sampler
The distribution sampler D is a stateful and probabilistic algorithm which, given the current state σ, outputs a tuple (σ , I, γ, z) where: (a) σ is the new state for D; (b) I ∈ {0, 1} p is the next input for the refresh algorithm; (c) γ is some fresh entropy estimation of I, as discussed below; (d) z is the leakage about I given to the attacker A. We denote by q D the upper bound on number of executions of D in our security games, and say that D is legitimate if
. . , q D } and σ 0 = 0. 1 We explain [DPR + 13]'s reason for explicitly requiring D to output the entropy estimate γ j . Most complex RNGs are worried about the situation where the system might enter a prolonged state where no new entropy is inserted in the system. Correspondingly, such RNGs typically include some ad hoc entropy estimation procedure E whose goal is to block the RNG from outputting output value R j until the state has accumulated enough entropy γ * (for some entropy threshold γ * ). Unfortunately, it is well-known that even approximating the entropy of a given distribution is a computationally hard problem [SV03] . This means that if we require our RNG G to explicitly come up with such a procedure E, we are bound to either place some significant restrictions (or assumptions) on D, or rely on some hoc and non standard assumptions. Indeed, [DPR + 13] demonstrate some attacks on the entropy estimation of the Linux RNG, illustrating how hard (or, perhaps, impossible?) it is to design a sound entropy estimation procedure E. Finally, we observe that the design of E is anyway completely independent of the mathematics of the actual refresh and next procedures, meaning that the latter can and should be evaluated independently of the "accuracy" of E.
Motivated by these considerations, [DPR + 13] do not insist on any "entropy estimation" procedure as a mandatory part of the RNG design. Instead, they place the burden of entropy estimations on D itself. Equivalently, we can think that the entropy estimations γ j come from the entropy estimation procedure E (which is now "merged" with D), but only provide security assuming that E is correct in this estimation (which we know is hard in practice, and motivates future work in this direction).
However, we stress that: (a) the entropy estimates γ j will only be used in our security definitions, but not in any of the actual RNG operations (which will only use the input I returned by D); (b) we do not insist that a legitimate D can perfectly estimate the fresh entropy of its next sample I j , but only provide a lower bound γ j that is legitimate. For example, D is free to set γ j = 0 as many times as it wants and, in this case, can even choose to leak the entire I j to A via the leakage z j ! More generally, we allow D to inject new entropy γ j as slowly (and maliciously!) as it wants, but will only require security when the counter c keeping track of the current "fresh" entropy in the system 2 crosses some entropy threshold γ * (since otherwise we have "no reason" to expect any security).
Security Notions
We define the game ROB(γ * ) in our game framework. We show the initialize and finalize procedures for ROB(γ * ) in Figure 1 . The attacker's goal is to guess the correct value b picked in the initialize procedure with access to several oracles, shown in Figure 2 . Dodis et al. define the notion of robustness for an RNG with input [DPR + 13]. In particular, they define the parametrized security game ROB(γ * ) where γ * is a measure of the "fresh" entropy in the system when security should be expected. Intuitively, in this game A is able to view or change the state of the RNG (get-state and set-state), to see output from it (get-next), and to update it with a sample I j from D (D-refresh). In particular, notice that the D-refresh oracle keeps track of the fresh entropy in the system and declares the RNG to no longer be corrupted only when the fresh entropy c is greater than γ * . (We stress again that the entropy estimates γ i and the counter c are not available to the RNG.) Intuitively, A wins if the RNG is not corrupted and he correctly distinguishes the output of the RNG from uniformly random bits. 
Definition 2 (Security of RNG with input). A pseudorandom number generator with input G = (setup, refresh, next) is called ((t, q D , q R , q S ), γ * , ε)-robust if for any attacker A running in time at most t, making at most q D calls to D-refresh, q R calls to next-ror/get-next and q S calls to get-state/set-state, and any legitimate distribution sampler D inside the D-refresh procedure, the advantage of A in game ROB(γ * ) is at most ε.
Notice that in ROB(γ * ), if A calls get-next when the RNG is still corrupted, this is a "premature" get-next and the entropy counter c is reset to 0. Intuitively, [DPR + 13] treats information "leaked" from an insecure RNG as a total compromise. We modify their security definition and define the notion of robustness against premature next with the corresponding security game NROB(γ * , γ max , β). Our modified game NROB(γ * , γ max , β) has identical initialize and finalize procedures to [DPR + 13]'s ROB(γ * ) ( Figure 1 ). Figure 3 shows the new oracle queries. The differences with ROB(γ * ) are highlighted for clarity.
In our modified game, "premature" get-next calls do not reset the entropy counter. We pay a price for this that is represented by the parameter β ≥ 1. In particular, in our modified game, the game does not immediately declare the state to be uncorrupted when the entropy counter c passes the threshold γ * . Instead, the game keeps a counter T that records the number of calls to D-refresh since the last set-state or get-state (or the start of the game). When c passes γ * , it sets T * ← T and the state becomes uncorrupted only after T ≥ βT * (of course, provided A made no additional calls to get-state or set-state). In particular, while we allow extra time for recovery, notice that we do not require any additional entropy from the distribution sampler D.
Intuitively, we allow A to receive output from a (possibly corrupted) RNG and, therefore, to potentially learn information about the state of the RNG without any "penalty". However, we allow the RNG additional time to "mix the fresh entropy" received from D, proportional to the amount of time T * that it took to get the required fresh entropy γ * since the last compromise.
As a final subtlety, we set a maximum γ max on the amount that the entropy counter can be increased from one D-refresh call. This might seem strange, since it is not obvious how receiving too much entropy at once could be a problem. However, γ max will prove quite useful in the analysis of our construction. Intuitively, this is because it is harder to "mix" entropy if it comes too quickly. Of course γ max is bounded by the length of the input p, but in practice we often expect it to be substantially lower. In such cases, we are able to prove much better performance for our RNG construction, even if γ max is unknown to the RNG. In addition, we get very slightly better results if some upper bound on γ max is incorporated into the construction.
Definition 3 (Security of RNG with input against premature next). A pseudorandom number generator with input G = (setup, refresh, next) is called ((t, q D , q R , q S ), γ * , γ max , ε, β)-premature-next robust if for any attacker A running in time at most t, making at most q D calls to D-refresh, q R calls to next-ror/get-next and q S calls to get-state/set-state, and any legitimate distribution sampler D inside the D-refresh procedure, the advantage of A in game NROB(γ * , γ max , β) is at most ε.
Relaxed Security Notions. We note that the above security definition is quite strong. In particular, the attacker has the ability to arbitrarily set the state of G many times. Motivated by this, we present several relaxed security definitions that may better capture real-world security. These definitions will be useful for our proofs, and we show in Section 4.2 that we can achieve better results for these weaker notions of security:
in which oracle calls to set-state are replaced by calls to reset-state. reset-state takes no input and simply sets the state of G to some fixed state S 0 , determined by the scheme and sets the entropy counter to zero. 3 -NROB 1set (γ * , γ max , β) is NROB(γ * , γ max , β) in which the attacker may only make one set-state call at the beginning of the game. -NROB 0set (γ * , γ max , β) is NROB(γ * , γ max , β) in which the attacker may not make any set-state calls.
We define the corresponding security notions in the natural way (See Definition 3), and we call them respectively robustness against resets, robustness against one set-state, and robust without set-state.
about the (low-entropy) state. Surprisingly, Ferguson and Schneier presented an elegant away to get around this issue in their Fortuna construction [FS03] . Their idea is to have several "pools of entropy" and a special "register" to handle next calls. As input that potentially has some entropy comes into the RNG, any entropy "gets accumulated" into one pool at a time in some predetermined sequence. Additionally, some of the pools may be used to update the register. Intuitively, by keeping some of the entropy away from the register for prolonged periods of time, we hope to allow one pool to accumulate enough entropy to guarantee security, even if the adversary makes arbitrarily many premature next calls (and therefore potentially learns the entire state of the register). The hope is to schedule the various updates in a clever way such that this is guaranteed to happen, and in particular Ferguson and Schneier present an informal analysis to suggest that Fortuna realizes this hope in their "constant rate" model (in which the entropy γ i of each input is an unknown constant).
In this section, we present a generalized version of Fortuna in our model and terminology. In particular, while Fortuna simply uses a cryptographic hash function to accumulate entropy and implicitly assumes perfect entropy accumulation, we will explicitly define each pool as an RNG with input, using the robust construction from [DPR + 13] (and simply a standard PRG as the register). And, of course, we do not make the constant-rate assumption. We also explicitly model the choice of input and output pools with a new object that we call a scheduler, and we define the corresponding notion of scheduler security. In addition to providing a formal model, we achieve strong improvements over Fortuna's implicit scheduler.
As a result, we prove formally in the standard model that the generalized Fortuna construction is premature-next robust when instantiated with a number of robust RNGs with input, a secure scheduler, and a secure PRG.
Schedulers Definition 4.
A scheduler is a deterministic algorithm SC that takes as input a key skey and a state τ ∈ {0, 1} m and outputs a new state τ ∈ {0, 1} m and two pool indices, in, out ∈ N ∪ {⊥}.
We call a scheduler keyless if there is no key. In this case, we simply omit the key and write SC(τ ). We say that SC has P pools if for any skey and any state τ , if (τ , in, out) = SC(skey, τ ), then in, out ∈ [0, P −1]∪{⊥}.
proc. SGAME w1, . . . , wq ← E
Fig. 4: SGAME(P, q, wmax, α, β), the security game for a scheduler SC Given a scheduler SC with skey and state τ , we write SC q (skey, τ ) = (in j (SC, skey, τ ), out j (SC, skey, τ ))
to represent the sequence obtained by iteratively computing (in, out, τ ) ← SC(skey, τ ) for q times. When SC, skey, and τ are clear or implicit, we will simply write in j and out j . We think of in j as a pool that is to be "filled" at time j and out j as a pool to be "emptied" immediately afterwards. When out j = ⊥, no pool is emptied. For a scheduler with P pools, we define the security game SGAME(P, q, w max , α, β) as in Figure 4 . In the security game, there are two adversaries, a sequence sampler E and an attacker A. We think of the sequence sampler E as a simplified version of the distribution sampler D that is only concerned with the entropy estimates (γ i ) q i=1 . E simply outputs a sequence of weights (w i ) q i=1 with 0 ≤ w i ≤ w max , where we think of the weights as normalized entropies w i = γ i /γ * and w max = γ max /γ * .
The challenger chooses a key skey at random. Given skey and (w i ) q i=1 , A chooses a start state for the scheduler τ 0 , resulting in the sequence
. Each pool has an accumulated weight c j , initially 0, and the pools are filled and emptied in sequence; on the T -th step, the weight of pool in T is increased by w T and pool out T is emptied (its weight set to 0), or no pool is emptied if out = ⊥. If at some point in the game a pool whose weight is at least 1 is emptied, the adversary loses. (Remember, 1 here corresponds to γ * , so this corresponds to the case when the underlying RNG recovers.) We say that such a pool is a winning pool at time T against (τ 0 , (w i ) q i=1 ). On the other hand, the adversary wins if T * i=1 w i ≥ α and the game reaches the (β · T * )-th step (without the challenger winning). Finally, if neither event happens, the adversary loses.
Definition 5 (Scheduler security). A scheduler SC with P pools is (t, q, w max , α, β, ε)-secure if for any pair of adversaries E, A with cumulative run-time t, the probability that E, A win game SGAME(P, q, w max , α, β) is at most ε. We call r = α · β the competitive ratio of SC. 4 We note that schedulers are non-trivial objects. Indeed, in Appendix A, we prove the following lower bounds, which imply that schedulers can only achieve superconstant competitive ratios r = α · β. Theorem 1. Suppose that SC is a (t, q, w max , α, β, ε)-secure scheduler running in time t SC . Let r = α · β be the competitive ratio. Then, if q ≥ 3, ε < 1/q, t = Ω(q · (t SC + log q)), and r ≤ w max √ q, we have that r > log e q − log e (1/w max ) − log e log e q − 1 , α > w max w max + 1 · log e (1/ε) − 1 log e log e (1/ε) + 1 .
The Composition Theorem
Our generalized Fortuna construction consists of a scheduler SC with P pools, P entropy pools G i , and register ρ. The G i are themselves RNGs with input and ρ can be thought of as a much simpler RNG with input which just gets uniformly random samples. On a refresh call, Fortuna uses SC to select one pool G in to update and one pool G out from which to update ρ. next calls are handled entirely from the register. Formally, we define a generalized Fortuna construction as follows: Let SC be a scheduler with P pools and let pools G i = (setup i , refresh i , next i ) for i = 0, . . . , P −1 be RNGs with input. For simplicity, we assume all the RNGs have input length p and output length , and the same setup procedure, setup i = setup G . We also assume G : {0, 1} → {0, 1} 2 is a pseudorandom generator (without input). We construct a new RNG with input G(SC, (G i ) Figure 5 . Theorem 2. Let G be an RNG with input constructed as above. If the scheduler SC is a (t SC , q D , w max , α, β, ε SC )-secure scheduler with P pools and state length m, the pools G i are ((t, q D , q R = q D , q S ), γ * , ε)-robust RNGs with input and the register G is (t,
. For our weaker security notions, we achieve better ε : 
Proof of Theorem 2
For convenience, we first prove the theorem for the game NROB 1set . (Recall that NROB 1set is a modified version of NROB in which the adversary is allowed only one call to set-state at the start of the game.) We then show that this implies security for the game NROB and sketch how to extend the proof to the two other notions.
Let us start with some notation to keep track of the state of the security game NROB 1set (α · γ * , β). Most importantly, for each of the P component RNGs G i we will keep track of a counter c i and a corruption flag corrupt i . These implicitly correspond to the notion of corruption in the basic security game ROB. In particular, the flags are all initially set to corrupt i ← false and c i ← n for each of the RNGs. Whenever the attacker calls D-refresh on our constructed RNG, it receives sample I with min-entropy at least γ, and the scheduler chooses component RNGs G in , G out . Then, we (1) increment c in ← c in + γ and if c in ≥ γ * set corrupt in ← false (2) if corrupt out = true set c out = 0. Whenever the attacker calls set-state or get-state, we set all of the flags corrupt i ← true and c i ← 0.
We also define the flag corrupt ρ for the register, which is initially set to corrupt ρ ← false. Whenever the attacker calls D-refresh and and the component RNG G out selected by the scheduler has corrupt out = false then set corrupt ρ ← false. Whenever the attacker calls set-state, get-state we set corrupt ρ ← true.
We now define a sequence of games:
1. Game 0 is the NROB 1set (α · γ * , β) security game against G. 2. Game i for i = 1, . . . , P is a modified version of Game 0 in which, whenever we call next out at any point in the game on a component RNG G out for out < i and corrupt out = false, we choose the output R ← {0, 1} uniformly at random instead of using the output of the RNG. 3. Game P + 1 is a modified version of Game P where, whenever next ρ is called and corrupt ρ is set to false, we output uniform randomness R ← {0, 1} . 4. Game P + 2 is the same as Game P + 1, but whenever the corrupt flag (the global compromised flag of NROB itself) is set to false we also set corrupt ρ to false.
Let A be an attacker on the NROB 1set security game running in time t and making q D queries to D-refresh, q R queries to get-next or next-ror, q S − 1 queries to get-state, and at most one set-state query at the very beginning of the game. In each game, we say that A wins if it guesses the challenge bit b = b. 
In particular, we define a distribution sampler D i,q D (with hard-coded values in the subscript) as shown in Figure 6 . We also define A as in Figure 7 to essentially simulate the NROB 1set game for A by using its oracles to get samples for G i and knowing the state of all other generators. Let τ A be the scheduler state chosen by A on set-state or simply the start state of the scheduler if he does not call set-state. Let b chal be the challenge bit chosen by the ROB(γ *
The second line follows because, conditioned on τ A = τ D , the bit b * is independent of b chal . This tells us that δ ≤ 2 m ε as we wanted to show. Next we show that Game P is indistinguishable from Game P + 1.
Proof. We prove this by reduction to the PRG security of the underlying "register" G. We simply employ a hybrid argument over all calls to this G when corrupt ρ = false, starting from the earliest, and change the output (S ρ , R) ← G(S ρ ) to being a uniformly random 2 bit value. In each hybrid i the state S ρ prior to the ith call is either (I) the initial value chosen uniformly random, (II) an output of a prior G call and therefore uniformly random in this hybrid, (III) some value xored with the output of some pool G i when corrupt i was set to false and therefore uniformly random.
Next we show that Game P + 1 is indistinguishable from Game P + 2. Proof. We prove this by reduction to scheduler security. In particular, Game P + 1 and P + 2 can only differ if in Game P + 1 it happens at some point that the corrupt flag is set to false but corrupt ρ = true. We call this event E bad . Intuitively, this corresponds to the case where the attacker makes a get-state or set-state query (causing corrupt and corrupt ρ to both be set to true) then sufficient entropy (αγ * ) has been added by the entropy sampler and sufficient time (βT * ) passes to ensure that corrupt is set to false, but none of the component RNGs G i managed to get enough entropy to set corrupt i to false or they were never emptied. This corresponds to a failure of the scheduler, and we show how to convert an attacker A and distribution D for which Pr[E bad ] ≥ δ into an attack E, A on the scheduler. For convenience, when E bad occurs, let i * be the index of the first entropy sample given after the last get-state, set-state (compromise) query before E bad occurs.
Claim. We have | Pr[A wins in Game
The attackers E, A guess a random value i ∈ [q D ] which intuitively corresponds to a guess on i * . E simply runs D for q D steps to get (among other outputs) the entropy estimates {γ j }. It outputs the sequence w 1 = γ i /γ * , w 2 = γ i+1 /γ * , . . .. The attacker A (skey) simply runs a copy of A, D completely simulating Game P + 1 and outputs the state of the scheduler τ immediately before the ith D-refresh query. It is easy to check that E, A win against the scheduler as long as D, A cause the event E bad to happen and the guess i = i * is correct. In particular, the entropy counters c i measuring the amount of entropy added to each RNG behave the same those in the scheduler security game, up to the scaling factor of γ * . Therefore, they have advantage δ/q D which proves the claim. Proof. The attacker's view in Game P + 2 is completely independent of challenge bit b. In particular, the next-ror queries with corrupt = false always return a random value no matter what the bit b is. Therefore, the attacker's probability of guessing the challenge bit is exactly Combining the above claims, we prove the theorem for the case of NROB 1set security. Notice that the same proof for the game NROB 0set would not require us to guess the initial state of the scheduler in going from Game i − 1 to Game i and would therefore avoid the 2 m factor loss in security.
We can now generically go from NROB 1set security to full NROB security. Indeed, an analogous version of the same claim can also be used to go from NROB 0set to NROB reset security with the same loss of parameters.
Claim. If an RNG satisfies (t, q D , q R , q S , γ * , γ max , ε, β)-NROB 1set security, then it also satisfies (t , q D , q R , q S , γ * , γ max , ε , β)-NROB security where t ≈ t, ε = q 2 D q S ε.
Proof. Let A, D be any attacker and distribution sampler against NROB with advantage δ. Let us divide up the game into at most q S epochs, where each epoch i begins either at the beginning of the game or with a set-state query. Let Game 0 be the original NROB game with challenge bit b = 0, and let Game i be the game where each next-ror query in epoch i with corrupt = false returns a uniformly random R ← {0, 1} . The output of the game is the output of A. We have |Pr[(Game 0)
We construct A , D with advantage δ/(q S q 2 D ) in the game NROB 1set . In particular we guess two additional indices j start < j end ∈ [q D ] for the samples used at the beginning and end of epoch i. The distributions sampler D runs D for q D times to get all the samples up front, immediately leaks the samples (I j , γ j , z j ) for j < j start and j > j end , and on each invocation outputs the samples (I j , γ j , z j ) starting from j = j start and incrementing j. The attacker A simply uses the leaked samples to completely simulate Game i for A up until the ith epoch. At that point A invokes its own challenger for NROB 1set with distribution sampler D and uses the state given by attacker A in epoch i to make its own set-state query. It then uses its oracles to simulate the ith epoch for A. Finally, at the end of the ith epoch A again uses the leaked samples to simulate the rest of the game for A. If A didn't guess j start , j end correctly, it outputs a random bit. Otherwise it outputs what A outputs. It's easy to see that if A guesses correctly and the challenge bit is b = 0 then the above perfectly simulates (Game i) and if the bit is b = 1 is perfectly simulates (Game i + 1). Therefore, the advantage of A , D in guessing the challenge bit is δ/(q S q 2 D ), which proves the claim.
Instantiating the Construction

A Robust RNG with Input
Recall that our construction of a premature-next robust RNG with input still requires a robust RNG with input. We therefore present [DPR + 13]'s construction of such an RNG. Let G : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n+ be a (deterministic) pseudorandom generator where m < n. Let [y] m 1 denote the first m bits of y ∈ {0, 1} n . The [DPR + 13] construction of an RNG with input has parameters n (state length), (output length), and p = n (sample length), and is defined as follows:
-S = refresh(S, I): Given seed = (X, X ), current state S ∈ {0, 1} n , and a sample I ∈ {0, 1} n , output: S := S · X + I, where all operations are over F 2 n . -(S , R) = next(S): Given seed = (X, X ) and a state S ∈ {0, 1} n , first compute
Theorem 3 ( [DPR + 13, Theorem 2]). Let n > m, , γ * be integers and ε ext ∈ (0, 1) such that γ * ≥ m + 2 log(1/ε ext ) + 1 and n ≥ m + 2 log(1/ε ext ) + log(q D ) + 1. Assume that G : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n+ is a deterministic (t, ε prg )-pseudorandom generator. Let G = (setup, refresh, next) be defined as above. Then G is a ((t , q D , q R , q S ), γ * , ε)-robust RNG with input where t ≈ t, ε = q R (2ε prg + q 2 D ε ext + 2 −n+1 ).
Dodis et al. recommend using AES in counter mode to instantiate their PRG, and they provide a detailed analysis of its security with this instantiation. (See [DPR + 13, Section 6.1].) We notice that our construction only makes next calls to their RNG during our refresh calls, and Ferguson and Schneier recommend limiting the number of refresh calls by simply allowing a maximum of ten per second [FS03] . They therefore argue that it is reasonable to set q D = 2 32 for most security cases (effectively setting a time limit of over thirteen years). So, we can plug in q D = q R = q S = 2 32 .
With this setting in mind, guidelines of [DPR + 13, Section 6.1] show that our construction can provide a pseudorandom 128-bit string after receiving γ * 0 bits of entropy with γ * 0 in the range of 350 to 500, depending on the desired level of security.
Scheduler Construction
proc. SC(skey, τ ) : IF τ = 0 mod P/wmax, THEN out ← ⊥ ELSE out ← max{out : τ = 0 mod 2 out · P/wmax} in ← F(skey, τ ) τ ← τ + 1 mod q OUTPUT (τ , in, out) To apply Theorem 2, we still need a secure scheduler (as defined in Section 4.1). Our scheduler will be largely derived from Ferguson and Schneier's Fortuna construction [FS03] , but improved and adapted to our model and syntax. In our terminology, Fortuna's scheduler SC F is keyless with log 2 q pools, and its state is a counter τ . The pools are filled in a "round-robin" fashion, (e.g., pool i is filled when τ = i mod log 2 q). Every log 2 q steps, Fortuna empties the maximal pool i such that 2 i divides τ / log 2 q.
SC F is designed to be secure against some unknown but constant sequence of weights w i = w. Roughly, if w > 1/2 i , then Fortuna will win by the second time that pool i is emptied. 6 We modify Fortuna's scheduler so that it is secure against arbitrary (e.g., not constant) sequence samplers by replacing the round-robin method of filling pools with a pseudorandom sequence. We also slightly lower the number of pools, and we account for w max , as we explain below.
Assume for simplicity that log 2 log 2 q and log 2 (1/w max ) are integers. We let P = log 2 q − log 2 log 2 q − log 2 (1/w max ). We denote by skey the key for some pseudorandom function F whose range is {0, . . . , P − 1}. Given a state τ ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} and a key skey, we define SC(skey, τ ) formally in Figure 8 . In particular, the input pool is chosen pseudorandomly such that in = F(skey, τ ). When τ = 0 mod P/w max , the output pool is chosen such that out is maximal with 2 out · P/w max divides τ . (Otherwise, there is no output pool.) Theorem 4. If the pseudorandom function F is (t, q, ε F )-secure, then for any ε ∈ (0, 1), the scheduler SC defined above is (t , q, w max , α, β, ε SC )-secure with t ≈ t, ε SC = q · (ε F + ε), α = 2 · (w max · log e (1/ε) + 1) · (log 2 q − log 2 log 2 q − log 2 (1/w max )) , and β = 4 .
Remark. Note that we set P = log 2 q − log 2 log 2 q − log 2 (1/w max ) for the sake of optimization. In practice, w max = γ max /γ * may be unknown, in which case we can safely use log 2 q − log 2 log 2 q pools at a very small cost. We can then still obtaining significant savings in α when w max = γ max /γ * is small even if w max is unknown. In other words, one can safely instantiate our scheduler (and the corresponding RNG with input) without a bound on w max , and still benefit if w max happens to be low in practice.
To prove the theorem, we define a sequence of games. Let Game 0 be SGAME(P, q, w max , α, β) against SC. Let Game 1 be Game 0 in which the adversary A is removed and the start state τ 0 is simply selected randomly τ 0 $ ← {0, . . . , q − 1}. Let Game 2 be Game 1 with F(skey, ·) replaced by H, a uniformly random function.
Claim. For any sequence sampler E and any adversary A,
. . , q − 1}, and let E be the event that A(skey) = τ R 0 . Then,
Claim. Suppose F is a (t, q, ε F )-secure pseudorandom function. Then, for any sequence sampler, E running in time t ≈ t,
Proof. Fix E. We will construct an adversary A F that attempts to distinguish between F under a random key and a uniformly random function. A F receives access to a function H, which is either F under a random key or uniformly random. A F then simulates E, receiving output (w 1 , . . . , w q ). Finally, A F simply simulates Game 1 with (w i ) and outputs the result of the game.
Note that A F outputs exactly the result of (Game 1) E if H is F under a random key and exactly the results of (Game 2) E when H is a random function. The advantage of A F in the PRF game is therefore
The result follows from the security of F.
Claim. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), let Game 2 as above with β = 4, P = log 2 q, 1/w max an integer, and α = 2 · (w max · log e (1/ε) + 1) · (log 2 q − log 2 log 2 q − log 2 (1/w max )) .
Then, for any sequence sampler E, Pr[E wins in Game 2] ≤ ε.
Proof. Fix the output of E, (w 1 , . . . , w q ). Let τ 0 ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} be some start state with the corresponding sequence (in i , out i ) q i=1 . Note that in i is uniformly random and independent of E, τ 0 . Let T * such that
(If no such T * , j exist, then SC wins by default.)
We wish to find a pool that was not emptied before time T * but is emptied relatively soon after time T * . Call the first such pool to be emptied win and the first time that pool win is emptied T win . Note that there is at most one k ≥ j such that pool k was emptied before time T * . If such a pool exists, call the first time that it is emptied T k . Note that 2 j · P/w max divides T k + τ 0 . We consider three different cases:
1. If no such k exists, then some pool whose index is at least j must be emptied by 2 j · P b /w max , and by hypothesis it cannot have been emptied before time T * . So T win ≤ 2 j · P/w max . 2. If k > j, then pool k is emptied at most every 2 j+1 · P/w max rounds, so the pool emptied at time T k +2 j ·P/w max cannot be pool k. But, 2 j ·P/w max divides T k +2 j ·P/w max +τ 0 , so some pool whose index is at least j must be emptied at time T k +2 j ·P/w max . Therefore, T win = T k +2 j ·P/w max < T * +2 j ·P/w max . 3. If k = j, then 2 j+1 · P/w max does not divide T k + τ 0 , and therefore 2 j+1 · P/w max must divide T k + 2 j · P/w max . So, a pool whose index is greater than j must be emptied at that time. Therefore T win ≤ T k + 2 j · P/w max < T * + 2 j · P/w max .
In all cases, T win < T * + 2 j · P/w max ≤ 2 j+1 · P/w max .
Recall that the scheduler wins if it empties a pool with weight at least one at any time before β · T * . Therefore, the scheduler wins if win has weight at least one after time T * .
Let 0 ≤ W win,i ≤ w max be the random variable that takes value w i if in i = win and 0 otherwise. Then, the weight of pool win at time T * is T * i=1 W win,i . We recall the standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound:
for any δ ∈ (0, 1). Plugging in, the probability that the scheduler loses after starting in state τ 0 is at most
Finally, we set ε = e 1/wmax · e − α 2wmax·P and solve for α: α = 2 · (w max · log e (1/ε) + 1) · P = 2 · (w max · log e (1/ε) + 1) · (log 2 q − log 2 log 2 q − log 2 (1/w max )) .
Putting everything together, for any E, A,
Scheduler Instantiation
To instantiate the scheduler in practice, we suggest using AES as the PRF F. As in [DPR + 13], we ignore the computational error term ε F and set ε SC ≈ qε. 7 In our application, our scheduler will be called only on refresh calls to our generalized Fortuna RNG construction, so we again set q = 2 32 . It seems reasonable for most realistic scenarios to set w max = γ max /γ * ≈ 
Putting It All Together
Now, we have all the pieces to build an RNG with input that is premature-next robust (by Theorem 2). Again setting q = 2 32 and assuming w max = γ max /γ * ≈ 32/500 ≈ 1/16, our final scheme can output a secure 128-bit key in four times the amount of time that it takes to receive roughly 20 to 30 kilobytes of entropy.
Constant-Rate Adversaries
We note that the numbers that we achieve in Section 5.4 are not ideal. But, our security model is also very strong. So, we follow Ferguson and Schneier [FS03] and consider the weaker model in which the distribution sampler D is restricted to a constant entropy rate. While this model may be too restrictive, it leads to interesting results, and it suggests that our construction (or, rather, the slight variant suggested in Section 6.3) may perform much better against distribution samplers that are not too adversarial. Indeed, if we think of the distribution sampler D as essentially representing nature, this might not be too unreasonable.
Constant-Rate Model. We simply modify our definitions in the natural way. First, we say that a distribution (resp., sequence) sampler is constant if, for all i, γ i = γ (resp., w i = w) for all i for some fixed γ (resp., w). Second, we say that an RNG with input is ((t, q D , q R , q S ), γ * , γ max , ε, β)-premature-next robust against constant adversaries if it is ((t, q D , q R , q S ), γ * , γ max , ε, β)-premature-next robust when the distribution sampler D is required to be constant. Third, we say that a scheduler is (t, q, w max , r, ε)-secure against constant sequences if, for some 8 α, β such that α · β = r it is (t, q, w max , α, β, ε)-secure when the 7 [DPR + 13] contains a detailed discussion of the subtleties here and the justification for such an assumption. 8 We note that when the sequence sampler E must be constant, (t, q, wmax, α, β, ε)-security is equivalent to (t, q, wmax, α , β , ε)-
sequence sampler E is required to be constant. When ε = 0 and the adversaries are allowed unbounded computation (as is the case in our construction), we simply leave out the parameters t and ε. Finally, we note that our composition theorem, Theorem 2, applies equally well in the constant-rate case. In particular, replacing a secure scheduler with a scheduler that is secure against constant sequences results in an RNG with input that is premature-next robust against constant adversaries, with identical parameters. This will allow us to achieve much better parameters for schedulers and RNGs with input against constant adversaries.
Optimizing Fortuna's Scheduler
Ferguson and Schneier essentially analyze the security of a scheduler that is a deterministic version of our scheduler from Section 5.2, with pseudorandom choices replaced by round-robin choices [FS03] . (This is, of course, where we got the idea for our scheduler.) They conclude that it achieves a competitive ratio of 2 log 2 q. However, the correct value is 3 log 2 q. 9 Ferguson and Schneier's model differs from ours in that they do not consider adversarial starting times τ 0 between the emptying of pools. Taking this (important) consideration into account, it turns out that SC F achieves a competitive ratio of r F = 3.5 log 2 q in our model (e.g., for q = 2 32 , we get r F = 112, as opposed to their claimed value of 64). 10 Interestingly, the pseudocode in [FS03] actually describes a potentially stronger scheduler than the one that they analyzed. Instead of emptying just pool i, this new scheduler empties each pool j with j ≤ i. Although Ferguson and Schneier did not make use of this in their analysis, we observe that this would lead to significantly improved results provided that the scheduler could "get credit" for all the entropy from multiple pools. Unfortunately, our model syntactically cannot capture the notion of multiple pools being emptied at once, and this is necessary for our composition theorem (Theorem 2). Fortunately, we notice that our model can simulate a multiple-pool scheduler by simply treating any set of pools that is emptied together at a given time as one new pool.
In Appendix B, we make this observation concrete and further optimize the scheduler of Fortuna to obtain the following result.
Theorem 5. For any integer b ≥ 2, there exists a keyless scheduler SC b that is (q, w max , r b )-secure against constant sequences where
In particular, with w max = 1 and q → ∞, b = 3 is optimal with r 3 ≈ 2.1 log 2 q ≈ 1.01 . We note that SC b performs even better in the non-asymptotic case. For example, in the case that Ferguson and Schneier analyzed, q = 2 32 and w max = 1, we have r 3 ≈ 58.2 ≈ r F 1.9 , saving almost half the entropy compared to Fortuna.
Constant-Rate Instantiation
Using the results from above, we note that applying our generalized Fortuna construction with the scheduler from Appendix B with b = 3, q = 2 32 , and w max = 1 yields an RNG with input that can achieve a secure 128-bit key after accumulating 3 to 4.5 kilobytes of entropy from a constant distribution sampler D. So, this constant-rate construction (in this restricted setting) is over twenty-five more efficient than our general construction. 11 (In Section 6.3, we present a scheduler that achieves these better results in the constant-rate case but also achieves the results presented in Section 5 in our stronger model.) 9 There is an attack: Let w = 1/(2 i + 1) and start Fortuna's counter so that pool i + 1 is emptied after 2 i · log 2 q steps. Clearly, SCF takes (2 i + 2 i+1 ) · log 2 q = 3 · 2 i · log 2 q total steps to finish, achieving a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to 3 log 2 q. 10 This follows from the analysis of our own scheduler in Appendix B. 11 To compare with our previous numbers from Section 5, recall that we had β = 4. Therefore, we note that the above scheduler achieves such security in four times the amount of time that it takes to receive about 750 bytes to 1.2 kilobytes of entropy. These are the proper numbers to compare, though they make less sense in the constant-rate case.
Ferguson and Schneier claim in [FS03] that their underlying seed (the key for AES in counter mode) reaches a secure 128-bit key after receiving what amounts to over 1.7 kilobytes of entropy (after accounting for the error and difference in models mentioned in Section 6). However, we note that they implicitly assume that their construction achieves perfect entropy accumulation. We achieve formally provable security and lose roughly a factor of four from using the construction of [DPR + 13] described in Section 5 to accumulate entropy, though due to various optimizations we manage to come within a factor of about 2 of Ferguson and Schneier's claim.
A Scheduler Secure in Both Worlds
Recall that in Section 5.2, we construct a secure scheduler, and above we construct a keyless scheduler that is secure only against constant sequence samplers but achieves much better parameters. We justify this weaker model by arguing that, in practice, a purely adversarial distribution sampler may be too stringent. We would like to say that the "true" security of our construction in a "real world" setting lies somewhere in between. And, we would like to say that practitioners can use one scheduler that is provably secure in the stronger model and achieves excellent parameters when adversaries happen to be friendlier.
However, this is unfortunately not true for the scheduler that we presented in Section 5.2. Recall that this scheduler selected which pool to fill at a given time pseudorandomly, using a PRF. It is not hard to see that its performance against constant sequence samplers is only slightly better than its performance against arbitrary adversaries. Intuitively, our keyless scheduler distributes weight evenly amongst all of its pools, while our more secure scheduler only does so in expectation. As a result, it can put entropy in the "wrong pool" with fairly high probability, even in the constant-rate case.
Luckily, there is a fairly simple solution. Instead of selecting a new pool pseudorandomly at each step, we instead choose a pseudorandom permutation of all P pools every P steps. In particular, given a state τ and a key skey, the scheduler computes π ← F(skey, τ /P ) where π is a permutation of P elements, F is a pseudorandom function whose range is all permutations on P elements, and P is the number of pools of the scheduler. It then fills pool in ← π(τ mod P ). The scheduler can otherwise behave like our scheduler from Section 6. It is not hard to see that our proofs of security in both the constant-rate and general case apply immediately to this modified scheduler. So, we recommend that practitioners implement this construction.
Relaxing the Seed Independence of the Distribution Sampler
In this section, we address another limitation of the original model of [DPR + 13], which our model inherits: the subtle issue of seed independence. In particular, the model of [DPR + 13] does not allow the distribution sampler D to have access to the initial seed seed of the RNG with input.
As explained by [DPR + 13], this is necessary to some extent, as there is a very simple impossibility result when D knows the seed. Given any RNG with input G whose input length is p ≥ 2, consider D that simply samples I 1 , . . . , I q D uniformly such that next(seed, S q D ) starts with a 0 where S 0 = 0, and S j = refresh(seed, S j−1 , I j ). Let A be the adversary that simply calls set-state(0), makes q D calls to D-refresh, calls next-ror, and simply outputs the first bit of the resulting output. It is clear that this pair of A and D will break the RNG security, and also that H ∞ (I j |I 1 , . . . , I j−1 , I j+1 , . . .
In fact, the original provably secure scheme from [DPR + 13] can be attacked much more dramatically (than the above generic attack) by a seed-dependent D. Recall, in that scheme part of the seed X, input I, and state S are simply elements in a finite field F 2 n . Also, if the start state S is 0 and the distribution sampler D samples some random variables I 1 , . . . , I q D , then after q D refresh calls the resulting state will be S = X q D −1 I 1 + X q D −2 I 2 + . . . + I q D . This suggests a natural attack: simply let I j be sampled uniformly from {0, X j−q D }. Clearly the distribution sampler provides q D bits of entropy in this case, but a quick check shows that the state S is the sum of uniformly random bits, so it can be only 0 or 1. The distribution sampler can therefore provide arbitrarily large amounts of entropy while only letting the state accumulate one bit.
Unfortunately, our generalized Fortuna scheme that is premature-next robust suffers a similar fate, even without attacking any of the "pool" RNGs. Indeed, if the distribution sampler D has access to the seed, then in particular, it has access to the key skey of the scheduler. D can therefore choose to only provide entropy to pools that will soon be emptied. For example, against our scheduler in Section 5.2, D can provide 1 bit of entropy whenever pool 0 will be filled next, and no entropy otherwise. If the adversary A then calls get-next repeatedly after every D-refresh call, the RNG will never accumulate any entropy (with high probability).
To sum up, existing schemes crucially rely on the seed-independence of the distribution sampler, and it is also clear that full seed-dependence is impossible. Finding the right (realistic and, yet, provably secure) balance between these extremes is an important subject for further research. In the next subsection, we make some initial progress along these lines by introducing a somewhat realistic model that effectively allows a certain level of seed dependence.
Semi-Adaptive set-refresh
Our extended adversarial model is motivated by the following realistic scenario given by Ferguson and Schneier when describing Fortuna [FS03] . They assume that there are several sources of entropy N 1 , N 2 , . . . contributing the inputs I j for the D-refresh procedure. Some of these sources might be completely controlled by the attacker A, while others are assumed to provide "good" entropy. Of course, since the actual RNG does not know the identity of these adversarial sources, they suggest that the RNG should take the inputs from N 1 , N 2 , . . . in a round-robin manner, ensuring that "good" sources periodically contribute fresh entropy to the system. Semi-Adaptive set-refresh Model. Translating this natural attack scenario to our model (for both ROB and NROB), we can think of the union of "good" sources N i as our original (seed-independent) distribution sampler D, while the union of "bad" source N i can be modeled by giving the (seed-dependent) attacker A access to the simple set-refresh oracle shown in Figure 9 . Note, in particular, that since set-refresh is called by A, the entropy counter c is not incremented during this call. Additionally, since in the above motivating example the RNG will call the good/bad entropy sources in a roundrobin manner, it seems reasonable to make the assumption that the order of set-refresh calls is seed-independent (though, crucially, the values I * in various set-refresh(I * ) calls can depend on the seed). 12 Overall, we can think of A and D as defining a partially seed-dependent distribution sampler D .
We arrive at the following natural extension of robustness, which we call the semi-adaptive set-refresh model, where q D is now the maximal sum of the number D-refresh and the set-refresh calls made by A:
-D selects a subset of indices J ⊆ {1, . . . , q D } where set-refresh calls will be made.
-A learns seed and J, and can play the usual ROB/NROB game, except the sequence of its D-refresh and set-refresh calls must be consistent with J. I.e., the j-th such call must be set-refresh iff j ∈ J.
Security Against Semi-adaptive set-refresh. We observe that the robustness proofs of both the original RNG construction of [DPR + 13] and our generalized Fortuna construction easily extend to handle semiadaptive set-refresh calls. Indeed, we even achieve identical parameters. Interestingly, we are not aware of an attack on [DPR + 13]'s construction even with seed-dependent (i.e., fully-adaptive) set-refresh calls, but our current proof crucially uses semi-adaptivity. Unfortunately, our attack on generalized Fortuna with a seed-dependent distribution sampler easily extends to an attack using seed-dependent (i.e., fully-adaptive) set-refresh calls instead. Indeed, using skey, A can schedule set-refresh calls such that D-refresh calls only affect pools that will soon be emptied.
Theorem 6. The security bound for the RNG of [DPR + 13] given in Theorem 3 extends to the semiadaptive set-refresh model. Similarly, the premature next robustness of the generalized Fortuna scheme given in Theorem 2 extends to the semi-adaptive set-refresh model, provided all the pool RNGs G i are robust in the semi-adaptive set-refresh model.
Since both proofs are simple variants of the original proofs, we will only sketch the key steps required to extend both proofs below.
Extending the Composition Theorem. We first show how to extend the proof of our main composition theorem (Theorem 2) to handle semi-adaptive set-refresh. To do so, we need to show how to extend the main reduction, mapping the "big" attackers A, D against the composed RNG G into "small" attackers A i , D i against the pool RNG G i , to the semi-adaptive set-refresh setting. Fortunately, this is simple because the scheduler key skey in our reduction is selected directly by D i (see Figure 6 ) and then immediately passed to A i via leakage. In particular, D i can now also compute the index set J , then use skey to "project" this set J to whatever calls j ∈ J will be "routed" to G i by the scheduler, and finally pass this "projected set" J i to the challenger. A i then learns the seed and J i and can simulate the run of A as before (see Figure 7) , handling set-refresh calls in the obvious way. Step (1) easily extends to semi-adaptive set-refresh calls, provided the notion of recovering security is naturally augmented to include semi-adaptive set-refresh calls.
Step (2) needs no changing at all (as preserving security already gives A access to a fully adaptive set-refresh oracle). Hence, it suffices to show how to extend the proof of recovering security in step (3) to a slightly modified version that includes set-refresh calls. We present the modified recovery security game together with the preserving security game and a modified version of [DPR + 13]'s composition theorem in Appendix C.
Intuitively, recovering security considers an attacker that sets the state to some arbitrary value S 0 and starts the distribution sampler D after k calls to D-refresh. Following that, d calls to D-refresh are made, resulting in final state S, where d, k are chosen by A such that the corrupt flag is false after the d calls to D-refresh. Then, the attacker A attempts to distinguish the full output (S * , R) ← next(S) from uniform. In our modified version, an index set J is chosen by D at the beginning, and the j-th D-refresh call is replaced by a set-refresh call if and only if j ∈ J.
Note that in the recovering game, [DPR + 13]'s RNG with input effectively computes a function of the form
and applies a PRG G to the result. In [DPR + 13], the authors show that recovering security follows immediately from the fact that h * X,X is a good randomness extractor. In particular, if the sum of the conditional min-entropies of the input is sufficiently high (i.e., above γ * ) and the I j are chosen independently of X, X , then (X, X , h * X,X (I 1 , . . . , I D )) is ε ext -close to uniform (with ε ext defined as in Theorem 3). Our key observation is simply that h * X,X is linear. Intuitively, we wish to define three sequences: I D,A j (seed) is the sequence of inputs to refresh calls, including both D-refresh and set-refresh; I D j is the contribution from D-refresh calls; and I A j (seed) is the contribution from A's set-refresh calls. We then want to say that h * X,X applied to I 
We can then write
Finally, we simply note that I D j are chosen independently from X, X (equivalently, they are the output of some valid distribution sampler D ), and therefore the proof of [DPR + 13] implies that (X, X , h * X,X (I D k+1 , . . . , I D k+d )) is ε ext close to uniform when the sum of the entropies of the corresponding distributions is sufficiently high. This of course immediately implies that X, X , U is also ε ext close to uniform. The result, presented below, then follows immediately from the proof in [DPR + 13].
Theorem 7. Let n > m, , γ * be integers and ε ext ∈ (0, 1) such that γ * ≥ m + 2 log(1/ε ext ) + 1 and n ≥ m+2 log(1/ε ext )+log(q D )+1. Assume that G : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n+ is a deterministic (t, ε prg )-pseudorandom generator. Let G = (setup, refresh, next) be defined as in Section 5. Then G is a ((t , q D , q R , q S ), γ * , ε)-robust RNG with input in the semi-adaptive set-refresh model where t ≈ t, ε = q R (2ε prg + q 2 D ε ext + 2 −n+1 ).
Combining Theorems 6 and 7, we see that the security of the instantiation that we presented in Section 5 immediately extends to the semi-adaptive set-refresh model with identical parameters.
1/w max new balls in each interval. Therefore, we've now marked at least q r + q 2r − 2/w max distinct balls, and no set of more than 2/w max balls have the same leave time.
Proceeding by induction, suppose that after j < wmax·q r steps, we have marked at least j k=1 q k·r − j/w max distinct balls, and no set of more than j/w max marked balls have the same leave time. We consider wmax·q (j+1)·r non-overlapping intervals of length (j + 1) · r/w max and note that in each such interval there must be (j + 1)/w max balls with the same leave time. So, we mark these and note that we must have marked an additional q 2r − 1/w max new balls and that no set of more than (j + 1)/w max marked balls have the same leave time.
It follows that this procedure will mark at least wmax·q/r k=1 q k·r − q/r balls. Recalling that the nth harmonic number satisfies H n = n k=1 1/k > log e (n + 1), it follows that we've marked at least q r · (log e q − log e r − log e (1/w max ) − 1) distinct balls in this way. But, there are only q balls total. It follows that r > log e q − log e (1/w max ) − log e log e q − 1.
It remains to construct an A that finds the winning τ in O(q · (t SC + log q)) time given SC, i, and r. A first computes (τ j ) q−1 j=0 in time O(q · t SC ). Now, as above, A divides {1, . . . , q} into disjoint intervals of length q i·r . For each such interval [T + 1, T + i · r], A simply simulates SGAME(P, i · r, r) against E i starting at τ T . 13 A returns τ T if it wins the simulation. If no τ T wins, A outputs FAIL. This takes time O(q log q).
(The log q overhead is incurred because A needs to write numbers that could be as large as q.)
The result follows.
From this, Proposition 1 follows easily.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix SC.
Let E be the sequence sampler that selects i $ ← {1/w max , . . . , q} and then behaves as the constant sequence sampler E i from Lemma 1. Let A be the adversary that behaves as follows: On input skey, A produces the keyless scheduler SC skey such that SC skey (σ) = SC(skey, σ). A then simulates A from the lemma, which outputs either some state τ or FAIL. If A outputs τ , A simply does the same. Otherwise, A outputs an arbitrary state.
By Lemma 1, A runs in time O(q·(log q+t SC )), and if r ≤ log e q−log e (1/w max )−log e log e q−1, then with probability at least 1/(q −1/w max +1), this procedure produces an E i , τ pair that wins SGAME(P, q, w max , r) against SC skey . The result follows.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose r 2 ≤ w 2 max q. For simplicity, we will assume 1/w max is an integer. Our proof begins similarly to that of Lemma 1. In particular, we let τ 0 be any start state. Let B 1 , . . . , B q be random variables over the choice of skey corresponding to leave times, B j = min{T ≥ j : out T = in j }. We again think of a ball with weight w j thrown into pool in j at time j and leaving the game at time B j . Intuitively, our approach will be to first show a pair of adversaries that win if balls take too long to leave. We'll then show a pair of adversaries that win if balls leave too quickly.
In particular, let E simply output a sequence of α/w max maximum weights followed by 0s, (w max , . . . , w max , 0, . . . 0). For any skey and any 1 ≤ T ≤ q, let τ T (skey) be the state that SC with skey reaches after T steps, starting at τ 0 . Let A k be the adversary that simply outputs τ kr/wmax (skey) on input skey. Note in order for SC to win SGAME against E, A k , it is necessary but not sufficient for there to be some j with kr/w max < j ≤ kr/w max + α/w max and B j ≤ (k + 1)r/w max . (Intuitively, there must be some ball that enters in the first α/w max steps of the game against A k and leaves before time r/w max .) Now, let A * k be an adversary that for 0 ≤ k < k selects j k uniformly at random with k r/w max < j k ≤ k r/w max + α/w max . If B j k > (k + 1) · r/w max , then A * k simply behaves as A k . Otherwise, A * k behaves as A k . Let E k be the event that B j k < (k + 1) · r/w max for all k ≤ k. Note that A * k wins if E k happens and B j > (k + 1) · r/w max for all j with kr/w max < j ≤ kr/w max + α/w max . 
Now, let E * be the sequence sampler that randomly selects j k with kr/w max < j k ≤ kr/w max + α/w max for all k < (w max + 1) · α/w max . E * then outputs the sequence (w i ) where w i = w max /(w max + 1) if i = j k for some k and w i = 0 otherwise. Suppose the event E k * occurs where k * = (w max + 1) · (α − 1)/w max + 1. Then, for all k ≤ k * , the j k -th ball leaves before the j k+1 -st ball enters. In particular, E * , A 0 win SGAME. Therefore,
It follows that α > w max w max + 1 · log e (1/ε) − 1 log e log e (1/ε) + 1 provided that ε < 1/e.
It is easy to see that A * k and E * run in time O(q(t SC + log q)), and the result follows.
B Construction of Constant-Rate Scheduler and Proof of Theorem 5
We first notice that Fortuna's scheduler can be easily modified to use a different base. In particular, for any integer b ≥ 2, we define a keyless scheduler, SC b . Roughly, SC b has P b ≈ log b q pools, numbered 0, . . . , P b − 1. The state τ ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} will just be a counter. The pools are filled in turn, and pool i is emptied whenever the counter τ divides b i · P b but not b i+1 · P b .
Our actual construction will be slightly more involved than the above, but it is simply an optimized version of this basic idea. In particular, we make four changes: For simplicity, we assume that log b log b q and log b (1/w max ) are both integers, and we let P b = log b q − log b log b q − log b (1/w max ). Then, we define SC b as in Figure 10 .
Theorem 5 shows that this scheme achieves a very good competitive ratio of r b ≈ bP b . In Appendix A, we show a lower bound in the constant-rate case of r > log e q − log e log e q − log e (1/w max ) − 1 (or r > P e − 1 in slightly abused notation), so this result is very close to optimal.
Plugging in and recalling that w ≤ w max /b and w max /w >
C Recovering and Preserving Secutity
C.1 Recovering Security
We consider the following security game with an attacker A, a sampler D, and bounds q D , γ * .
-D sends J ⊂ {1, . . . , q D } to the challenger.
-The challenge chooses a seed seed Definition 6 (Recovering Security). We say that PRNG with input has (t, q D , γ * , ε)-recovering security if for any attacker A and legitimate sampler D, both running in time t, the advantage of the above game with parameters q D , γ * is at most ε.
C.2 Preserving Security
We define preserving security exactly as in [DPR + 13]. Intuitively, it says that if the state S 0 starts uniformly random and uncompromised and is then refreshed with arbitrary (adversarial) samples I 1 , . . . , I d resulting in some final state S d , then the output (S * , R) ← next(S d ) looks indistinguishable from uniform.
-The challenger chooses an initial state S 0 ← {0, 1} n , a seed seed ← setup, and a bit b ← {0, 1} uniformly at random.
-The attacker A gets seed and specifies an arbitrarily long sequence of values I 1 , . . . , I d with I j ∈ {0, 1} n for all j ∈ [d]. -The challenger sequentially computes S j = refresh(S j−1 , I j , seed) for j = 1, . . . , d. If b = 0 the attacker is given (S * , R) = next(S d ) and if b = 1 the attacker is given (S * , R) ← {0, 1} n+ .
-The attacker outputs a bit b * .
Definition 7 (Preserving Security). A PRNG with input has (t, ε)-preserving security if for any attacker A running in time t, the advantage of A in the above game is at most ε.
C.3 Modified Composition Theorem
With these modified definitions, [DPR + 13]'s proof of their composition theorem immediately extends to handle semi-adaptive set-refresh queries.
Theorem 8. Assume that a PRNG with input has both (t, ε p )-preserving security and (t, q D , γ * , ε r )-recovering security as defined above. Then, it is ((t , q D , q R , q S ), γ * , q R (ε r + ε p ))-robust in the semi-adaptive set-refresh model where t ≈ t.
